CNSC welcomes feedback on any regulatory document at any time REGDOC- supersedes RD, Design of New Nuclear Power. CNSC has issued its Fukushima report – posted on the CNSC website on that the design intent complies with CNSC design requirements (RD, RD-. Re: The Approvals Process for New Reactors in Canada – RD & RD ( CNSC) request for feedback on the comments received on the.
|Published (Last):||13 March 2010|
|PDF File Size:||16.3 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||4.98 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
The design provides the means for detecting levels and distributions of neutron flux. The design facilitates routine inspection of sea, lake, and river flood defences and demonstrates fitness for service. A test acceptance leakage rate provides the maximum rate acceptable under actual measurement tests.
Where a direct trip parameter does not exist for csc given credited means, there are two diverse trip parameters specified for that means.
Alternative types of isolation may be used where justification is provided. Diversity The presence of two or more redundant systems or components to perform an identified function, where the different systems or components have different attributes so as to reduce the possibility of common-cause failure.
Unintended actions and failure of passive components are considered as two of the modes of failure of a safety group.
Defence-in-depth level four is achieved by providing equipment and procedures to manage accidents and mitigate their consequences as far as practicable. Anticipated operational occurrence An operational process rd337 from normal operation which is expected to occur at least once during the operating lifetime of a facility but which, in view of the appropriate design provisions, does not cause any significant damage to items important to safety or lead to accident conditions.
This entails careful attention to selection of appropriate design codes and materials, design procedures, equipment qualification, control of component fabrication and plant construction, and use of operational experience. To the extent practicable, this document is technology-neutral with respect to water-cooled reactors, and includes direction concerning:.
Information about the radiological conditions in the plant and its immediate surroundings, and about meteorological conditions in the vicinity of the plant, is to be accessible from the emergency support centre. Consistent with the concept of defence-in-depth, the design provides multiple barriers for protection against malevolent acts, including physical protection systems, engineered safety provisions, and measures for post-event management, as appropriate.
The design authority identifies SSCs important to safety that are credited to withstand a design basis earthquake DBEand ensures that they are qualified accordingly. These routes are identified with clear and durable signage, emergency lighting, ventilation and other building services essential to their safe use. The plant layout and procedures control access to radiation areas and areas of potential contamination.
Cabling for the instrumentation cnec control equipment in the SCR is such that a fire in the main control room cannot disable the equipment in the SCR. Related considerations include facility access, as well as lifting and packaging capabilities. The plant safety assessment includes structural analyses for all civil structures important to safety.
The results of the safety analyses are fed back into the design.
The human factors engineering program also facilitates the interface dnsc the operating personnel and the plant by promoting attention to plant layout and procedures, maintenance, inspection, training, and the application of ergonomic principles to the design of working areas and working environments.
These activities are performed to standards commensurate with the importance of the respective safety functions of the SSCs, cnsd no significant reduction in system availability or undue exposure of the site personnel to radiation.
The aim of the third level of defence is to minimize the consequences of accidents by providing inherent safety features, fail-safe design, additional equipment, and mitigating procedures. The aim of the second level of defence is to detect and intercept deviations from normal operation in order to prevent AOOs from escalating to accident conditions, and to fnsc the plant to a state of normal operation.
This expectation extends to the provision of adequate capacity flow rate and storage volumes in the systems performing this function. Where possible, the design provides for testing to demonstrate that these reliability requirements will be met during operation.
Cnc addition, the design limits the amount of activated material and its build-up. Fnsc design includes a clearly defined continuous leak-tight containment envelope, the boundaries of which are defined for all conditions that could exist in the operation or maintenance of the reactor, or following an accident.
The adequacy of the design, including design tools and design inputs and outputs, are verified or validated by individuals or groups that are independent from those who originally performed the work.
This means that a postulated initiating event is not necessarily an accident itself; rather it is the event that initiates a sequence that may lead to an operational occurrence, a design basis accident, or a beyond design basis accident, depending on vnsc additional failures that occur. The axes of the turbine generators are to be oriented in such a manner as to minimize the potential for any missiles that result from a turbine break-up striking the containment, or striking other SSCs important to safety.
Deterministic analyses can use either conservative or best estimate methods. The design authority identifies where and when the containment boundary is credited for providing shielding for people and cnsx. These rules comply with appropriate rd-37 engineering practices. The design provides for exclusion and removal of all foreign material and corrosion products that may have an impact on safety. Jet impact The potential internal hazard associated with high pressure fluid released from a pressure-retaining component.
Civil structures important to safety are designed and located so as to minimize the probabilities and effects of internal hazards such as fire, explosion, smoke, flooding, missile generation, pipe whip, jet impact, or release of fluid due to pipe breaks.
To the greatest extent practicable, application of this principle enables plant systems to rd-3377 into a safe state if a system or component fails, with no necessity for any action to be taken. Postulated initiating event An event identified in the csnc as leading to either an anticipated operational occurrence or accident conditions.
The filtration system reliably achieves rr-337 necessary retention factors under the expected prevailing conditions, and is designed in a manner that facilitates appropriate efficiency testing. All pressure-retaining SSCs are protected against overpressure conditions, and are classified, designed, fabricated, erected, inspected, and tested in accordance with established gd-337.
Achievement of defence-in-depth level three calls for provision of inherent safety features, fail safe design, engineered design features, and procedures that minimize the consequences of DBAs. Where such intervention is necessary, the following conditions apply:.
The MCR is to be provided with secure communication channels to the emergency support centre and to off-site emergency response organizations, and to allow for extended operating periods.
The design authority should consider incorporation of complementary design features that will:. The plant design takes into account the potential for internal hazards, such as flooding, missile generation, pipe whip, jet impact, fire, smoke, and combustion by-products, or release of fluid from failed systems or from other installations on the site.
A systematic approach is used to assess the potential bio-physical environmental effects of the NPP on the environment, and the effects of the environment on the NPP. The design provides two independent means of preventing recriticality from any pathway or mechanism during the GSS. This includes identification of the large loads, and situations where they need to be lifted over areas of the plant that are critical to safety.
The design provides a system capable of detecting and monitoring leakage from the reactor coolant system. A safety analysis of the plant design includes hazards analysis, deterministic safety analysis, and probabilistic safety assessment techniques.