In this elegantly crafted book, Miranda Fricker’s timely project of “looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice” (viii) comes to fruition. : Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing ( ): Miranda Fricker: Books. Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
|Published (Last):||11 April 2008|
|PDF File Size:||3.33 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||1.57 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Emmalon Davis – – Hypatia 31 3: Admittedly, injsutice would be dangerous — even potentially disastrous — to contest Fricker’s ordering outright, to imply that the ethical might have to yield to political expediency or could justifiably give way to the pressures of vested interest. Chapter 1 illustrates testimonial injustice through compelling readings of gender power at work in Anthony Minghella’s screenplay of The Talented Mr.
Rae Langton – – Hypatia 25 2: Testimonial injustice consists in prejudices that cause one to “give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word”: Sign in to use this feature. Classical, Early, and Medieval Poetry and Poets: Power and the Ethics of Knowing Miranda Fricker Abstract Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes of philosophy, but sometimes we would do well to focus instead on injustice. For example, Fricker describes a woman attending a meeting in the late s at which post-partum depression was discussed; in this case, the shared social resource – a linguistic label and sharing of experiences – enabled an understanding of a condition she had experienced and was previously blamed for.
When, for example, the language of “sexual harassment”, “racism”, “homophobia”, or “sexism” had not achieved common currency in the rhetorical spaces of western societies, an entire range of experiential reports could not claim a hearing or expect communal uptake, in a strong sense of “could”. Analogous failures to correct for responses “saturated with racist constructions of the ‘Negro'” 90 permeate the testimonial injustices in To Kill a Mockingbirddemonstrating — as Fricker convincingly shows — that “testimonial responsibility requires a distinctly reflexive social awareness” 91, italics original.
The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues.
Thus, too, where Fricker holds ethics and politics apart, I see them as co-constitutive in ways that the “social imaginary” better captures. James Bohman – – Social Epistemology 26 2: Fricker steers a epistemicc passage between the Scylla of the one and the Charybdis of the other.
Questions of doxastic responsibility and how best to exercise it; of how responsible hearers should develop and practice testimonial sensibility to enable them to be “critically open to the word of others”, shape the neo-Aristotelian conception of the virtuous subject, “‘trained’ or socially educated … to see the world in moral colour … [on] an analogy with … a virtuous agent’s ethical sensibility” The question of who singular or plural determines the colour scheme of this world remains an open epietemic but there are guidelines at least in the direction of a basic, if tacit, “do no harm” principle, and more actively in the epistemoc role the account accords to the development of a injusice epistemic “second nature” 85 for which there is a precedent in Aristotelian moral philosophy.
As the title conveys, Fricker is working in the newly fertile borderland between theories of value and of knowledge. Toward a Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance. In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower.
Her readers will look forward to the next phase of this creative, vitally important project. Clearly, it is as components of a socially-saturating belief structure epitemic such injustices as Fricker exposes must be understood: The appeal must injusticd to exemplary instances and events in which people rricker managed to move imaginatively beyond damaging practices and policies, have enlisted a critical mass of like-minded others to initiate the new meanings, the collective political change, the nascent just society, that is the moral-political goal of systematically countering epistemic injustice.
Science Logic and Mathematics. Gaile Pohlhaus – – Hypatia 27 4: Ethicsfeminist epistemologyfeminism.
Admittedly, this shift comes about on ground prepared by a cluster of projects: Christopher Hookway – – Episteme 7 2: In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal epistemc different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice. History of Western Philosophy. The book is not only a wonderful, ambitious attempt to bring ethics and epistemology together in a way that has rarely been done before, it is also a beautiful, and powerful, attempt to name something that matters.
Gloria Origgi – – Social Epistemology 26 2: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. This book argues that there injusttice a distinctively epistemic genus of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower, wronged therefore in a capacity essential to human value.
Thus in societies ordered according to hierarchical structures of power and privilege i. Choose your country or region Close. A woman unable to gain a hearing for damage inflicted by persistent sexual harassment, owing to “a lacuna in epistdmic collective hermeneutical resources” ; a man unable to own his “nascent identity as a homosexual” in s America illustrate the point.
Sign in to use this feature. As a result, Epistemic Injustice makes a significant contribution, not just to epistemology, but to all of the disciplines.
Francesco Pupa – – Metaphilosophy 39 Retrieved 8 March In chapter 2 the analysis expands to focus on stereotypes as themselves stereotypical vehicles of prejudice, in what Fricker calls “the credibility economy” 30 ff. Relational Knowing epiatemic Epistemic Injustice: